The Prospect of Global History

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The Prospect of Global History

The Prospect of Global History

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We live in a world of rapid economic change, of enormous concentrations of economic power, sharp social inequalities, and drastic disparities in the distribution of political power – both between and within states. […] If we, as historians, want to remain relevant to public debate, we need to engage these issues. Footnote 13 essential unity in the centuries between 500 and 1500 that sets them apart as a ‘civilization’ distinct from those before and after, it has a rapidly diminishing efect on their practice. As teachers of undergraduate and still more of graduate students, as organizers of research seminars, even, when commercial pressures permit, as writers of surveys and textbooks, they nowadays prefer to divide that millennium into three parts, though with only rough agreement among themselves as to where the dividing points may be. he middle (or, as we often say, ‘central’) one is still routinely called ‘medieval’, while those before and after shade with varying degrees of subtlety into the late antique and the early modern. his fragmentation is most obviously the result of the growth of knowledge, but also relects conceptualization. hat ‘early’ and ‘later’ middle ages are still widely preferred to the newer terminologies more often relects reairmation of particular readings of those subperiods themselves than championship of the essential unity of the entire millennium.7 All periodizations, of course, risk disguising continuities and inhibiting consideration of things that ought to be considered together. Conversely, they remain useful and vital for as long as they are capable of framing large questions that reward investigation and discussion, or are pressed on the academy by the curiosity of the wider world. It is hard to identify such questions about ‘the middle ages’ at or anywhere near the cutting edge of current or recent debate, either academic or popular. he idea has become for European history efectively useless, and, in most ways, a nuisance.8 It serves mainly to distract attention from continuities with the periods before and after while legitimizing vacuous generalities spanning vastly diferent regions, societies, periods, and cultures. he depressing history of the word ‘medieval’ itself makes the point. Long discarded as a serious analytical category it clings to life as a considerable vested interest, and as a form of intellectual ghettoization that serves to excuse the ignorance of outsiders about what goes on inside its imagined boundaries, and of its devotees about almost everything else. It is a pretty safe rule of thumb, applicable equally whether it is used as a term of approbation or abuse, that the more someone uses the word ‘medieval’ the less they know about the middle ages. It has not always been so. We like to remember that the idea of the middle age was invented by Petrarch and Leonardo Bruni in the fourteenth and ifteenth centuries and elaborated by Cellarius in the seventeenth,9 but it did not catch on straight away. No British historian used the term ‘Middle Ages’ before Hallam, in 7 For instance, David Rollason, Early Medieval Europe 300–1050: he Birth of Western Society (London: Routledge, 2012), explicitly at pp. 6–8; John Watts, he Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 9–42. 8 For a comprehensive and sophisticated assault, to which I am very much in debt, Constantin Fasolt, Past Sense: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern History (Leiden: Brill, 2014), especially at pp. 545–96; Constantin Fasolt, ‘Hegel’s Ghost: Europe, the Reformation and the Middle Ages’, Viator 39 (2008), pp. 345–86. 9 For a convenient summary, see Willam A. Green, ‘Periodization in European and World History’, Journal of World History 3, 1 (1992), pp. 13–53. here is a certain irony in Green’s conclusion that 1500 was no longer a useful dividing point for European history, but (largely under the impetus of world systems theory) had become an essential one for global history. Global history seems to be the history for our times. Footnote 1 Huge syntheses such as the seven-volume Cambridge World History or the six-volume A History of the World suggest the field has come to fruition. Footnote 2 Robert Moore, in his contribution to the book under review, The Prospect of Global History, is quite confident in this respect: if there is a single reason for “the rise of world history”, it is “the collapse of every alternative paradigm” (pp. 84–85). As early as 2012, the journal Itinerario published an interview with David Armitage with the title “Are We All Global Historians Now?” Footnote 3 That may have been provocative but Armitage obliged by claiming “the hegemony of national historiography is over”. Footnote 4 Unnecessary Dependences Illustrating Circulation in Pre-modern Large-scale History Nicholas Purcell Writing Constitutions and Writing World History Linda Colley I N T RO D U C T I O N Demonstrating how new written constitutions have progressively afected most peoples across the globe can seem a straightforward enterprise.1 Between 1776 and 1780, eleven one-time American colonies drafted state constitutions. hese had an impact on the US Federal constitution of 1789 which in turn inluenced the constitutions of Revolutionary France, and—along with the latter—helped precipitate new, often ephemeral constitutions in Haiti, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, and elsewhere. By 1820, some ifty constitutions were in being in Continental Europe, and this represented only a fraction of the total number attempted. In Northern Italy alone, at least thirteen new constitutions were drafted between 1796 and 1810. Some eighty more constitutions were formally implemented between 1820 and 1850, many of them in Latin America. In the second half of the long nineteenth century, written constitutions spread conspicuously beyond Europe and the Atlantic world. Between 1850 and 1914, they were adopted—in various forms and with varying degrees of success—in Australia, Japan, China, Tunisia, the Ottoman Empire, the Philippines, and parts of Polynesia and the Malay Peninsula; and attempts were made to introduce them in the hai kingdom of Siam, Iran, and some Indian princely states. Both World Wars sparked intense bouts of new constitution-writing. So, dramatically, did the collapse of the Western European empires after 1945 and the fall of the Soviet empire. Of the 190 or so constitutions now in existence, by far the majority have been drafted or revised in the last sixty years. Every year, it is estimated, men and women in at least ten countries are at work on a new constitution.2 1 Earlier versions of this paper were given at the ‘New Directions in Global History’ conference at the University of Oxford (27–29 September 2012), and the ‘Constitution-writing in the long eighteenth century’ symposium at Princeton University (11 April 2014). I am grateful for the responses on those occasions, and for the subsequent critiques of Jeremy Adelman, James Belich, Peter Holquist, and Jeremy Waldron. 2 Lists of written constitutions are available in Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsberg, he Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 215–30; and the database of the Comparative Constitutions Project: (accessed 1 February 2015). he Constitutions of the World Online database gives the texts of most of these documents, implemented and abortive, from 1776 to 1849.

ships, but pursued prey, accepted risk, and carried guns and diseases as well as any. Mughal expansion into India, Islam’s America, might just be the greatest postplague spread of all. Morocco, which did have plague and guns, conquered a large chunk of West Africa in the late sixteenth century, projecting its power over 1,700 kilometres.52 Giancarlo Casale has recently demonstrated that the Ottoman Empire was not inactive or unsuccessful in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century, and it established substantial domains in East Africa.53 But the Ottomans already had a vast empire, including most of southeast Europe. Like China, it did not need to chase furs or ish; other peoples brought them to it. Unlike Europeans, it was not squeezed out of the Mediterranean slave market; it was doing the squeezing. Instead, it became the anvil on which European expansion had to hammer itself out. 52 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Medieval Africa, 1250–1800, rev. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 57. 53 Giancarlo Casale, he Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). the success of US policy in the Philippines, even though a long war of resistance to American rule had still to be concluded: I believe I am speaking with historic accuracy and impartiality when I say that the American treatment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its combination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound common sense, marks a new and long stride forward, in advance of all the steps that hitherto have been taken, along the path of wise and proper treatment of weaker by stronger races.16Preface We envisage this volume as the irst in a new series in global history which is characterized by historical depth, a wide geographical range, and the concrete application of diferent approaches to global history, engaging with multiple methodologies, coming from an interdisciplinary perspective, and teasing out connections and their limitations by asking challenging questions. Some of these ideas are explored in this volume. he Editors of cotton goods has come to contribute to new industrial revolutions across the world, many new opportunities for exploitation, and environmental devastation such as the draining of the Aral Sea by the wanton demands of Uzbekistan’s cotton monoculture. his thumbnail sketch suggests why the global historian might take cotton seriously. Turning to a more speciic Islamic angle, Richard Bulliet’s recent Yarshater lectures at Harvard ofer a striking demonstration of the impact of cotton on the early Islamic world. he Prophet Muhammad was opposed to luxurious apparel, so a distinct preference for cotton clothing, as opposed to silk, developed amongst Muslims. In the years after the seventh-century Arab conquest of Iran, this led to the establishment of cotton cultivation in the Iranian plateau; the transition of Iranians from being primarily Zoroastrian to being primarily Muslim can in part be measured by the spread of cotton cultivation. For the ninth and tenth century Bulliet talks of a ‘cotton boom’ during which Iran was transformed from a territory of landed estates and autarchic villages to one of towns, trade, and a rich cultural life. hen, there came the ‘big chill’, a hundred years of climate change, which hit Iran’s cotton industry severely and brought a rapid decline in prosperity. he cultivated classes—rich merchants, poets, administrators, and historians— left the plateau to seek their fortunes in Muslim courts from Anatolia to Bengal. hey took with them their language, Persian, and their high levels of skill in government.36 Like cotton, sugar has also changed the face of human history. From its early mass production in places like Tawahin as-Sukka in the eleventh-century Jordan Valley, it was to inluence the formation of colonies, the development of slavery, and the composition of peoples. From the eighteenth century, it has had a substantial impact on diet particularly in the West. In consequence it keeps tens of thousands of dentists in business. Today the average human being consumes 24 kg of sugar a year. In richer societies it is recognized to be a growing general health hazard.37 Cofee emerged from Sui khanqahs (monasteries) in ifteenth-century Yemen to become the top agricultural export of twelve countries today and the world’s seventh largest legal agricultural export by value. It has been prohibited in Muslim societies from time to time but it is also the irst drink one might ofer a guest in contemporary Arabia. hrough much of the world it helps to sustain sociability. here is no agreement as to whether its health efects are positive or negative.38 36 Richard W. Bulliet, Cotton, Climate, and Camels in Early Islamic Iran: A Moment in World History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 37 Graham Chandler, ‘Sugar Please’, Saudi Aramco World 83, 4, (2012), pp. 36–43; Jelle Bruinsma (ed.), World Agriculture towards 2015/2030: An FAO Perspective (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), p. 119. 38 Ralph S. Hattox, Cofee and Cofeehouses: he Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985); Bennett Alan Weinberg and Bonnie K. Bealer, he World of Cafeine: he Science and Culture of the World’s Most Popular Drug (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 267–316. Two of the book’s editors, James Belich (Beit Professor of Imperial and Commonwealth History, University of Oxford) and John Darwin (Professor of Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford) will examine the book and global history with:

Table 2.2 GDP per capita in Europe and Asia, 725–1850 (1990 international dollars) England/GB 725 900 980 1086 1120 1150 1280 1300 1348 1400 1450 1500 1570 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 lists of spaces, people, and events that are somehow linked to each other.85 However, connections alone do not suice to get to grips with the major institutions of the modern era, especially states and the structures of global capitalism. States and, by extension, empires are more than mere networks, as historical sociologists from Otto Hintze to Charles Tilly and Michael Mann have impressively shown.86 And global capitalism cannot be reduced to market integration and commodity lows, disregarding the ‘mercantilist’ intervention of states, the efects of war and the agency of entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers.87 Historical Sociology with its antennae for power and violence, and the processual dynamics of both, can remind Global History that the world has never been as ‘lat’, twodimensional and peaceful as some theorists of globalization tend to suggest. One might go on assessing the convergence and divergence between Global History and Historical Sociology in many diferent ields. here are topics of Global History that cannot be handled in a responsible manner without some familiarity with the relevant social science literature. It is hardly possible, for example, to work on the global history of the family in ignorance of the rich scholarly traditions in the sociology and anthropology of kinship and gender. In other instances, sociologists (and political scientists) will not be able to tell historians much they do not already know. hus while a few political scientists are authorities on the theory of empire, the most important elements of that theory were elaborated by historians—since the time of Edward Gibbon. C O N C LU S I O N : A M B I VA L E N C E he strengths and weaknesses of the respective disciplines vary from topic to topic. In general, Historical Sociology is strong on the methodology of explanation— which is generally not Global History’s forte, while Global Historians in their practice of writing frequently come up with reasonable solutions for problems that seem daunting and intractable in theory, for instance the relationship between processes and institutions.88 he relationship between Global History and Historical Sociology is an ambivalent one. Neither of those two minority ields enjoys comfortable acceptance by its home discipline, and neither is institutionally stable and self-contained. hey are both in search of thematic relevance, intellectual attractiveness, and scholarly stature. Cooperation between the two could be genuinely beneicial, not just a 85 he same concern was voiced from a sociologist’s point of view by Wolfgang Knöbl in his opening remarks at the workshop ‘Macrosociology and World History Writing’, Freiburg Institute of Advanced Study, Freiburg i.Br. (Germany), 10 to 11 February 2012 (unpublished manuscript, p. 4). 86 See, above all, Michael Mann, he Sources of Social Power, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986–2013); the most relevant volume for theoretical purposes continues to be vol. I. A highly original discussion of the history of the state from a global history angle is Charles S. Maier, Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2014). 87 See as a wide-ranging survey Larry Neal and Jefrey G. Williamson (eds), he Cambridge History of Capitalism, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 88 On that see Karen Barkey, ‘Historical Sociology’, in: Hedström and Bearman, Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, pp. 712–33.

between 1815 and 1914.19 Table 2.1 gives Anglo-American price gaps for a variety of commodities between 1870 and 1913. In the case of agricultural commodities such as wheat and animal products, British prices were higher than American ones, so the price gaps are the percentage by which the former exceeded the latter. In the case of industrial commodities such as cotton textiles or iron bars, American prices were higher than British ones, so the price gaps quoted are the percentage by which prices in Boston or Philadelphia exceeded prices in Manchester or London. In nearly all cases (sugar is the outstanding exception) price gaps fell, indicating that transatlantic commodity markets were becoming better integrated. Nor was price convergence limited to the North Atlantic. Between 1873 and 1913, the Liverpool–Bombay cotton price gap fell from 57 per cent to 20 per cent; the London–Calcutta jute price gap fell from 35 per cent to 4 per cent; and the London–Rangoon rice price gap fell from 93 per cent to 26 per cent. Between 1846–55 and 1871–9, during which period Japan was opened up to trade with the rest of the world, the Japan–Hamburg nail price gap fell from 400 per cent to 32 per cent, and the reined sugar price gap fell from 271 per cent to 39 per cent.20 In the nineteenth century, such declining price gaps were ubiquitous, and often quite dramatic. hey involved all continents, and manufactured goods as well as primary products. Exceptions are rare, and where these occur they involved, as often as not, the intervention of governments trying to substitute ‘artiicial oceans’ 19 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History. 20 Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 404–5. Britain Netherlands Portugal France Spain Italy USSR Muslim concentrations in USSR Independent Muslim states Muslim concentrations in China Global History’ written with capital letters denotes the academic discipline and its various discourses, ‘global history’ its object of study. In the case of ‘Historical Sociology’ such ambiguity is unlikely to occur; capitals are used only for reasons of symmetry. 2 Dominic Sachsenmaier, Global Perspectives on Global History: heories and Approaches in a Connected World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 3; Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Global History in a National Context: he Case of Germany’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 20 (2009), pp. 40–58. 3 No individual author can be named for this period. Its main achievement was a cooperative work: Walter Goetz (ed.), Propyläen-Weltgeschichte: Der Werdegang der Menschheit in Gesellschaft und Staat, Wirtschaft und Geistesleben, 10 vols (Berlin: Propyläen, 1931–3).



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